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The term “normativity” is ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy. It is a term that purports 
to explain. What it explains are facts of an apparently ubiquitous kind, namely correct-
ness, social institutions, rationality, and much more —semantics, scientific truth, and 
ethics. But there is a problem with these “explanations.” These facts, sometimes under 
different descriptions, have already been explained by social scientists, especially some 
of the classical sociologists and anthropologists, in terms that do not appeal to “norma-
tivity.” In other cases, there are rivalries: one can give a normative account of scientific 
truth, and a sociological and historical one which does not appeal to normativity. These 
are issues with first-order explanations. But there is also a question about second-order 
matters: can we even provide explanations without appealing to normative notions such 
as correctness, as they apply to the explanations themselves? And if not, normativity is 
indispensable, at least to our metaphysics.
So what is normativity? The concept appears in so many contexts that it is difficult 
to explain except by analogy to paradigm cases. It is the property that makes something 
correct, that makes an inference valid, or makes a reason rational. The classical case 
is the law: what makes a law binding? The normative property of bindingness, without 
which law would not be law, that is to say it would not possess a property we normally 
associate with law and even define law in terms of. The problem with this claim is simple: 
nothing that actually happens in the world of social action or behavior seems to require 
that this property actually exists. What is required to explain what people such as judges 
and policemen do is that they believe the law is binding. Normativism, however, rejects 
this, and makes the claim that belief is not enough: the law is really binding and to explain 
real bindingness requires that we appeal to a special set of facts or entities which can 
explain this special normative feature of the law. 
There is an apparent circularity in normativist explanations and descriptions: you 
have to describe the fact in a certain way to necessitate the normativist explanation. 
But normativists typically claim that their descriptions are the only correct ones, or that 
they are part of the normal world of belief and thus provide the material that needs 
explaining. And they can also argue that the social scientist who tries to explain the 
same material non-normatively necessarily uses normative language and therefore 
implicitly accepts normativism. The anti-normativst replies that his language is used in 
a non-normative way, and thus does not have the normative implications the normati-
vist says its does. 
Claims about normativity turn out to have a more or less standard form, and a more 
or less standard conflict with alternative explanations. Something is described in a par-
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ticular way, and it is claimed that this thing —law, for example— can only be explained 
by reference to the intrinsic normativity of the legal. A parallel account is given which 
describes the same empirical facts, usually without the problematic normative language 
of the first description, and explains them without reference to intrinsic normativity. The 
first description requires a mysterious thing —mysterious because it is outside the realm 
of ordinary explanation. The second does not. 
When we live in a society we use a common set of ideas that enables coordination, 
assessing blame, and all sorts of other activities. These ideas are not good explanatory 
accounts: they typically involve fictions, ideas that don’t fit with science, dubious entities, 
and so on. Moreover, they vary from society to society. Call these Good Bad Theories: 
they are good for the myriad purposes of coordination they serve, bad as science or 
explanation. Much normativism trades on taking the Good Bad Theories of our own 
society as expressing some sort of normative reality.
But there is a problem of reflexivity for normativism. Take the example of Mauss’s dis-
cussion of gift exchange among the Maori. The Maori have a standard Good Bad Theory: 
they believe that a force, hau, attaches to a gift, and must be expiated by the giving of 
another gift in return. Even the most committed normativist would agree that there is no 
such thing as hau, and that the practice is sustained by the belief in hau, not by the force 
of hau. But what about the appeal to hau-like forces that is characteristic of normativism? 
Why aren’t these better (and sufficiently) explained by the belief in them, such as the 
belief in legality, rather than the normative fact or property of legality? 
These are the simple questions. No one is compelled to believe in hau. The tough 
ones come with things that we supposedly cannot reject: rationality, concepts, and 
so forth. Here the tu quoque arguments seem compelling. But here we are also dea-
ling with abstracta, not concrete pieces of social action or problems of understanding 
others. So we have the same problem as before: there are parallel accounts, some 
with “normative” concepts, or concepts that can be construed as such, and some alter-
natives which dispense with at least some aspects of normativity, or construe the con-
cepts differently. 
And there is another issue with this parallelism: these abstracta need to be brought 
into contact with the world of actual human beings. So there has to be a component of 
explanations involving these abstracta that has to do with such things as learning, mental 
habituation, the formation of dispositions to reason in certain ways, and so forth. Similarly 
for ‘understanding’, one can claim that something, such as possessing the same con-
cepts, is a condition of understanding, but there is still the activity of understanding itself. 
The question this raises is whether the naturalistic part of these explanations is sufficient 
to account for the phenomenon in question, without the “normative” part.
Here philosophy and social theory intersect at the same explanatory problem. Nor-
mativism attempts to ground normativity in some “natural” collective facts, such as 
social reactions or collective intentions. These are not only questionable notions, they 
are bad in ways familiar to social theorists from the long history of failed collective con-
cepts. An interactionist approach avoids these problems. And it seems that a suitable 
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account of such things as understanding can also be constructed “naturalistically” with 
the help of recent neuroscience and the discovery of mirror neurons. Mirror neurons 
allow a kind of understanding of actions and intentions that is preconceptual. These 
modes of understanding can be extended to encompass everything that was explained 
by normative abstracta. 
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